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ABSTRACT
Considered is discrete two-person game theory where the players
choose their strategies separately and independently. Payoffs can be
of a very general nature and are not necessarily numbers. However, the
totality of outcomes (pairs of payoffs), corresponding to the possible
combinations of strategies, can be ranked separately by each player
according to their desirability to that player. For specified ai, a
largest level of desirability (corresponds to one or more outcomes Oi)
occurs for the i-th player such that he can assure, with probability at
least oy that an outcome with at least this desirability is obtained;
this can be done simultaneously for i=1,2. Game theory of a median na-
ture occurs when (y1 =cya=112. A method is given for determining O,i and
an optimum (mixed) strategy for each player. Practical aspects of ap-
plying this percentile game theory are examined. Results for (y1=cYa=1/2
are compared with those previously developed for discrete median game
theory.
*Research partially supported by Mobil Research and Development
Corporation. Also associated with ONR contract N00014-68-A-0515
and NASA Grant NGR 44-007-028.
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INTRODUCTION AND DISCUSSION
The case of two players with finite numbers of strategies is consi-
dered. Each player selects his strategy separately and independently of
the strategy chosen by the other player.
A pair of payoffs, one to each player, occurs for every combination
of strategy choice by the players. These pairs are the possible outcomes
for the game. The payoffs can be of an extremely general nature. Some
of them may not even be numerical (for example, they may denote cate-
gories). However, the outcomes are considered to be such that they can
be ranked, according to relative desirability level, separately by each
player.
The ranking of outcomes can be tedious but should usually be achie-
vable on a paired comparison basis. 	 That is, for each two outcomes, a
player expresses his preference (with equal desirability a possibility).
A ranking is obtained when no circularity of definite preference occurs, s
Often, reasonable rules can be imposed that will eliminate curcularity
of definite preference.
	 For example, a suitable function of the two
payoffs might be used for ranking the outcomes.	 This approach avoids
the practical difficulty of requiring a player to make a huge number
of paired comparisons.
It is to be emphasized that a ranking of outcomes not only considers
the payoff to the player doing the ranking but also the corresponding
payoff to the other player.
	 Thus, a ranking provides the relative desira-
bility of what can occur for the game, including results for the other
player.
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The basis for percentile game theory is that each player should
want the occurrence of an outcome with a high level of desirability
(to him). However, a player does not fully control the outcome choice
and needs a criterion (to guide him in strategy choice) that reflects
his desires and also is usable. The class of criteria considered in
this paper is always usable and, for each player, should often include
a criterion that reflects the player's desires.
For player i (i=11 2), let the outcomes be ordered according to
increasing desirability to him. Also, player i specifies a probability
a  which represents the assurance with which he wishes to obtain an
outcome with reasonably high desirability. A largest level of desira-
bility occurs among the outcomes such that player i can assure, with
probability at least a 	 an outcome with at least this desirability
is obtained. This can be done simultaneously for both players. The
symbol O i designates the outcome, on outcomes, with this largest level
of desirability for player i.
A method (oriented toward minimum effort) is given for identifying
Oi and determining an optimum mixed strategy for each player. This
method of solution tends to maximize a. for a given level of desirabilityi
for O..I
Only a finite number of values are attainable for a i . A value is
attainable for ai when use of a corresponding optimum strategy (by player
f
i) cannot assure some outcome at least as desirable as O with probabilityi	 .
in excess of a.. For a given player (and method of solution), attainablei
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values are determined by the ordering for the outcomes and the locations
of the outcomes in the payoff matrix for the player. It would seem ad-
vantageous to use only oz i that are attainable. For example, an attain-
able ai whose value is nearest the stated a i should be a satisfactory
choice in some cases.
Some results are developed for helping reduce the effort needed to
identify 
0  
and determine an optimiun mixed strategy for player i. That
is, consider all outcomes that are at least as desirable as a specified
outcome. Let the locations of these outcomes be marked in the payoff
matrix for player i. Depending on the locations of the marks, a bound
is developed for the probability with which player i can assure the oc-
currence of an outcome in the set that is marked.
It is to be noted that assuring at least the level for 0  with
probability at least a,
z 
is the best that can be "forced" by player i
when 
u  
is given. However, the mixed strategy used by the other player
can be such that the probability of at least 0. substantially exceeds
i
ai . This could happen even when the other player uses a mixed strategy
that is optimum for him (in the sense of this paper). In fact, evalua-
tion of the true probabilities of at least O 
i
., when both players use
optimum strategies, provides information that can be useful. Suppose,
for example, that player 1 has only one optimum strategy but player 2
has several strategies that are optimum. Also, player 2 knows the value
used for al . Then, player 2 might choose among his optimum strategies
by considering what happens when player 1 uses his optimum strategy.
1
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Some results have already been developed for the case of discrete
median game theory. In fact, the idea of ranking the outcomes, which
led to the material of this paper, was initially used in ref. 1 for med-
ian game theory. In this paper, median game theory occurs as the spec-
ial case where uj =a,2=1/2. A comparison is made between this special case
and previous material for median game theory.
The next section contains a statement of the results for this paper.
The following sections provides a comparison of the case U l =a2=1/2 with
previous material for median game theory. The final section contains some
verification for the stated results.
STATEMENT OF RESULTS
The same results apply to each player and are stated for player i.
Material is first given for the general case where a  can have any value
in the interval O<a i !sl. Then, modifications for the case where CY. is an
attainable value are considered. The results are stated in terms of a
marking of outcome locations in the payoff matrix for player i. The r(-^!2)
rows of this payoff matrix correspond to the strategies for player i
while the c(^2) columns are the strategies for the other player.
The case of U i :9 1/2 is considered first. As the initial step, mark the 	 h
position(s) in the payoff matrix for player i of the outcome(s) with the
highest level of desirability to player i. Next, also mark the position(s)
of the outcome(s) with the next to highest desirability. Continue this
marking, according to decreasing level of desirability, until the first
time that marks in all the columns can be obtained from a set of rows whose
number does not exceed 1/a i . Then, if r-s is the smallest number of rows
in such a set, a marked outcome can be assured with probability at least
11(r- s)Z«i, perhaps greater than 1/(r-s). Now, remove the mark(s) for the
least desirable outcome(s) of those that received marks. Then, by the
following procedure, determine whether some one of the remaining outcomes
can be assured with probability at least (Y
i . 
The procedure is to replace
every marked position in the matrix by unity and all others by zero.
The resulting matrix of ones and zeroes is considered to be for a zero-
sum game with an expected-value basis and is solved for the value of the
game to player i. Some one of the outcomes corresponding to the marked
positions can be obtained with probability at least a  if and only if
this game value is at least ai.
Suppose that the game value is less than 01	 Then the maximumi
level of desirability that can be assured with probability at least 
U 
is the level corresponding to the outcome(s) with marking(s) removed
ti
at this step. otherwise (game value at least cx i ), remove the mark (s)
for the least desirable outcome(s) of those still having marks. Then,
as just described, determine whether some one of the remaining marked
outcomes can be assured with probability at least g .. If not, thei
maximum level of desirability that can be assured with probability at
least ai is the level corresponding to the outcome(s) with markings)
removed at this step. If a probability of at least cx, can be assured,i
continue in the same way until the first time some one of the remaining
marked outcomes cannot be assured with probability at least a.. Then, the
maximum desirability level that can be assured with probability at least
Cxi is the level for the outcome(s) 	 with marking(s) removed at this
1step.
Now consider the case of a'i > 1/2. Nark the matrix positions of
outcomes (as for ai s 1/2), according to decreasing desirability level,
until the last time that unmarked positions in all rows can be obtained
from a set of columns whose number does not exceed 1/(1-a i ). If c-s'
is the smallest number of columns in such a set, player i can assure a
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marked outcome with probability at most 1 - 1/(c-s'), and perhaps less
than this value, where it is to be noticed that cY,i 
z 1 - 1/(c-s').
When (Yi = 1 - 1/(c-s'), replace all marked positions by unity and all
unmarked positions by zero. Then, treating the resulting payoff matrix
as for a zero-sum game with an expected-value basis, solve for the game
value to player i. If this game value is ai , a desirability level at
least equal to the last (and lowest) level marked can be assured with
probability a,.
x
When this game value is less than ai , or when ai > 1 - 1/(c-s'),
the procedure is to also mark the position(s) of the outcomes) with
the highest desirability level among those whose positions are still
unmarked. Replace all marked positions by unity and all unmarked posi-
tions by zero in the resulting marking of the matrix. This matrix of
ones and zeroes is considered to be for a zero-sum game with an expec-
ted-value basis and is solved for the value to player i. If the game
value is at least ( Yip a desirability level at least equal to that for
the outcome(s) marked at the last step can be assured with probability
at least ai . If the game value is less than ai , continue in the same
way until the first time some one of the marked outcomes can be assured
with probability at least ai . Then a desirability level at least equal
to that for the marking at the last step can be assured with probability
at least ai . Incidentally, if a  > 1 - 1/c, the marking needs to be
continued until the first time that a pure strategy of all marked out-
comes occurs for player i.
The method of solution deterrines the outcome(:) Oi . Now consider
determination of an optimum strategy for player i. Use the matrix mark-
4
i4
I	 .
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ing that (ultimately) resulted in the smallest set of marked outcomes
(by the procedure used) such that an outcome of this set can be assured
with probability at least (Yi . Replace the marked positions by unity
and the others by zero. Treat the resulting matrix as that for a zero-
sum game with an expected-value basis. An optimum strategy for player
i in this zero-sum game is ai-optimum for him. The value of the game
for player i is an attainable ai that is at least equal to the stated
(Y,i being used.
Next, consider situations where a desired value is stated for (.Yi
but the requirement that cxi must be attainable is imposed. Then, 'ehe
attainable value used is ordinarily: The nearest value at most equal to
the stated cY 
i
,, the nearest value at least equal to it, or the nearest
attainable value to the stated ui . The nearest attainable value at
least equal to the stated cxi is directly determined by the procedure
given for the case of general a.. when the stated u is not attainable,
the nearest attainable value at most equal to it is determined by first
removing the mark(s) for the outcome(s) with lowest desirability level
(in the final marking for general solution using the stated ai)• Then,
marked positions are replaced by unity, unmarked positions by zero, and
the resulting matrix treated as for a zero-sum game with an expected-
value basis. The ",alue of this game for player i determines the attain-
able o!i that is at most equal to the stated ai . The procedure for deter-
mination of the attainable a. to be used also provides 0.3. and a corres-
ponding optimum strategy for player i.
The set of all available ai such that 0 < ai s 1 can be determined
in a straightforward but tedious fashion. As the new marks for
i
1
I
s _^
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decreasing levels of desirability are made, they are replaced by unity
and the unmarked positions are replaced by zero, in the matrix for play-
er i. The resulting matrix is considered to be for a zero-sum game with
an expected-value basis. Solution of this game for the value to player
i provides an attainable value for u i . This is done for all levels of
desirability in the ordering of the outcomes by player i. Of course,
more than one level of desirability can provide the same value for ai.
Also, ai is zero when the markings do not occur in all columns, and
CYi is unity for a marking, and all further markings, when there is at
least one row that is fully marked.
The method used requires that all outcomes with equal desirability
to player i be simultaneously marked in his payoff matrix. This tends
to redv^e the amount of computation and also to maximize the probability
of obtaining at least a stated level of desirability. However, other
ways could be used in which not all the outcomes of equal desirability
are marked at the same time. In fact, the pref..- ed saquence approach
of ref. 2 could be used to mark each outcome separately. These special
approaches might possibly be useful in some cases but are not considered
here.
COMPARISON•WITH MEDIAN WATERIAL
Median game theory occurs as the special case of percentile game
theory where a, = a2 = 1/2. Several results have already been developed
for median game theory (refs. 1 1 2 ) 3, 4, 5). The first results are
given in ref. 2. The application advantages of these first results are
expounded in ref. 3. Results with increased applicability are given
1
i
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in ref. 4, and results with general applicability are given in ref. 5.
For all of these cases, the players are assumed to select their strat-
egies separately and independently.
The possibility of cooperation is considered in ref. 1 and some
rules are developed for deciding when cooperation is preferable to
optimum use of median game theory. In development of these rules, the
idea of a general ranking of outcomes arose (a restricted form of rank-
ing is used in ref. 5). This •idea is the basis for the material on
generally applicable two-person percentile game theory given in this
paper.
The results for al = U2 = 1/2 are the most useful that have been
obtained for median game theory with no cooperation (and include the
results of ref. 5 as a special case). They are generally applicable
sl:bject only to the ability of the players to rank the outcomes acc-
ording to increasing desirability level. Any kind of outcomes that
can be ranked by the players are eligible for use. The ranking can be
according to any type of preference. For example, an increase in the
payoff to the other player might represent an increase in the desira-
bility of an outcome.
Only the case of separate and independent choice of strategies is 	
1
considered here. However, an approach similar to that of ref. 1 should
be usable in deciding on situations where cooperation is preferable to
two-person percentile game theory, and is a subject for further research.
1-11-
VERIFICATIONS
The statements about the probability properties when marks in all
the columns can be obtained from a set of r-s rows follow from
THEOREM I. When the marked positions of outcomes in the matrix
for player i are such that marks in all columns are obtained from r-s
rows. this slaver can assure occurrence of a marked outcome with oro-
bability at least 1/(r-s).
PROOF. When r-s = 1, so that a row is fully marked, the probab-
ility is unity that some one of its outcomes can be assured by the player.
Suppose that r-s z 2. Let p l ,...,pr and gl ,...,gc be the mixed
strategies used, with a unit probability being possible. The probability
of `-^obtaining a marked outcome is
rr
w piQii=1	 '
where Qi is the sum of the q's for the columns that have marked outcomes
in the i-th row. The largest value of this probability that the player
can assure, throughichoice of p l ,...,pr, is
G =	 Anin :,i ce (YQax.
1	 ^
	
ql ,... , q-	 i
Let i(1),...,i(r-s) be r-s rows that together contain marked values in
all columns. For any minimizing choice of the values for gl,...,gc,
all of Qi (1)' " '' Qi (r-s) are at most G. Thus,	
E	 ,(r- s)G Z Qi (1) +...+Qi (rAs) z 1
and a probability of at least 1/(r-s) can be assured by the player.
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COROLLARY When the unmarked positions of outcomes in the matrix
for player i are such that unmarked positions in all rows are obtained
from c-s' columns, the other player can assure an unmarked outcome with
probability at least 11(c-s').
When the circumstances for the Corollary hold, player i can assure
a marked value with probability at most 1 - 11(c-s'). If c-s' S 1/(1--ai),
then cY.i ? 1 - 1/(c-s'), so that player i can assure a marked outcome
with probability at most cxi (perhaps less). Also a probability as high
as cxi can possibly occur only when cxi = 1 - 1/(c-s').
The remaining results can be verified by suitable use of
THEOREM II. A sharp lower bound on the probability that player i
can assure some outcome of a specified set that is marked in his payoff
matrix, and one or more corresponding optimum strategies for him in ac-
complishing this, can be determined from solution of the value to player
i of a zero-sum game with an expected-value basis. The payoff matrix
for player .i in this game has the value unity at all marked positions
and zero at all other positions.
PROOF. Let each player use an arbitrary but specified mixed strat-
egy (with a unit probability possible). The expression for the expected
payoff to player i with these strategies is also the expression for the
probability of the occurrence of some one of the outcomes that are marked
in the original payoff matrix for player i.
r
y
i	 .
1
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